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Abstract
Increasing the infection risk early in an epidemic is individually and socially
optimal under some parameter values. The reason is that the early patients
recover or die before the peak of the epidemic, which flattens the peak. This
improves welfare if the peak exceeds the capacity of the healthcare system and the
social loss rises rapidly enough in the number infected. The individual incentive
to get infected early comes from the greater likelihood of receiving treatment than
at the peak when the disease has overwhelmed healthcare capacity.
Calibration to the Covid-19 pandemic data suggests that catching the infection
at the start was individually optimal and for some loss functions would have
reduced the aggregate loss.
Keywords: epidemiology; dynamic optimization; intertemporal decisions; ar-
bitrage; welfare.
JEL classification: C61; D83; D91
In a severe enough epidemic that is likely to overwhelm the capacity of the health-
care system, getting infected early is individually rational, in particular under most
parameter values consistent with the data on the Covid-19 pandemic. The reason is
that getting treated early when the healthcare system still has free capacity is better
than facing rationing of medical services during the peak of the epidemic. If the frac-
tion infected at the peak is large enough, then the higher likelihood of treatment when
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catching the disease early outweighs the greater total probability of being infected when
trying to catch it early (as opposed to reducing risk throughout the epidemic). The
preference for early exacerbation holds for any health condition likely to need treatment
at some point during the epidemic, not just for the disease causing the epidemic.
Getting infected early imposes the obvious negative transmission externality on
others—the initial disease carriers spread the infection. However, the welfare effect of
early infection is ambiguous because of a positive peak load externality : the initially
infected people recover or die before the peak of the epidemic, thus reduce the load on
the healthcare system when its capacity is needed the most. The balance of the trans-
mission and peak load externalities determines whether infecting part of the population
initially improves welfare.
If many people try to get infected early, then the peak of the epidemic arrives ear-
lier and may be higher or lower than without attempted early infection. The more
people who try to acquire the disease early, the lower the incentive to acquire it ini-
tially, because the less spare healthcare capacity remains early on. Symmetrically, this
arbitrage argument shows that the more people who try to delay the infection before
the peak, the lower the incentive to protect oneself during that time. The strategic
substitutability of risk choices leads to a mixed equilibrium in which some fraction of
the population arbitrages the infection timing by getting infected early. The rest best
respond by doing nothing until the fraction infected is large enough, at which point
everyone tries to reduce their risk until the peak of the epidemic passes.
The arbitrage of infection timing flattens the peak of the epidemic and spreads it
over a longer time. The welfare effect of this depends on the loss function. If the loss
rises fast in the fraction infected, then welfare depends mostly on the height of the
peak. In this case, reducing the maximal prevalence of the disease reduces aggregate
losses. If the loss increases slowly in the fraction infected, then the wider and lower
peak under early infection is worse than the higher and later peak under the standard
policy of reducing risk.
The literature on theoretical epidemiology is vast, starting from Kermack and McK-
endrick (1927). The study of the incentives to protect oneself goes back at least to Peltz-
man (1975), although in a safety context. An early review of economic epidemiology is
the book of Philipson and Posner (1993).
Toda (2020) finds that delaying infection control efforts until a significant fraction of
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the population is infected is socially optimal. The present work takes the natural next
step and shows that the opposite intervention to the usual risk reduction is individually
and socially optimal in the early stage of a severe epidemic.
The individual and social optimality of protection from disease are also studied in
Auld (1996, 2006); Chen and Toxvaerd (2014); Fenichel (2013); Galeotti and Rogers
(2013); Goyal and Vigier (2015); Heinsalu (2020); Kremer (1996); Kremer and Morcom
(1998); Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2017); Talama`s and Vohra (2019); Toxvaerd (2019).
To the author’s knowledge, the literature has not considered deliberate early infection
as a feasible (let alone optimal) individual choice or policy instrument.
Mathematically, the environment with a changing hazard rate of an event (infection)
over time resembles Khan and Stinchcombe (2015). The current paper studies a game
in addition to an individual decision. Each agent solves a control problem (chooses risk
every period) instead of a stopping problem (when to vaccinate).
The next section examines individual incentives to reduce or increase risk, and
calibrates the results to the Covid-19 data from the empirical literature. Section 2
studies infection arbitrage by interacting decision makers. Welfare comparisons using
the compartmental susceptible-infected-recovered model are in Section 2.1. Section ??
extends the individual and equilibrium results to continuous time. A discussion of
policy implications is in Section 4.
1 A two-period example
A continuum of individuals each face a risk of infection r1 ∈ (0, 1) in period t = 1 and
if this risk does not realize, then a greater risk r2 ∈ (r1, 1) in period 2. The loss `t > 0
conditional on infection also increases over time: `2 > `1. The loss `t summarizes the
expected discounted value of all negative consequences of the risk. Rising risk and loss
over time reflect an epidemic spreading in the population, which both increases the
infection probability and leaves fewer medical resources per patient, thus worsens the
expected consequences of infection. The improvement in treatment or the availability
of supplies is assumed slower than the spread of the epidemic, and is incorporated in `t
w.l.o.g.
Before being infected, the individual can take an action at ∈ {aˇt, 1, aˆt}, with 0 <
aˇt < 1 < aˆt <
1
rt
, to decrease or increase the infection risk to atrt that period. Action
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at = 1 is costless and leaves the risk unchanged, aˇt costs cˇ ∈ (0, r1`1) and decreases the
risk, and aˆt costs cˆ > 0 and increases the risk. Example actions reducing infection risk
are social distancing measures, using protective equipment, following hygiene practices.
Example actions increasing the risk are doing (more) work in healthcare, contaminated
waste disposal, or in crowded locations, or deliberately obtaining the disease agent and
infecting oneself.
In the second period (at the peak of the epidemic), the individual does not increase
the risk, because −aˆ2r2`2 − cˆ < −r2`2. Decreasing the risk is optimal if −aˇ2r2`2 − cˇ >
−r2`2, which reduces to
cˇ < (1− aˇ2)r2`2. (1)
If cˇ ≥ (1− aˇ2)r2`2, then the individual leaves the risk unchanged. Only the continuation
value pi∗2 for an uninfected person at the start of period 2 matters for subsequent results.
The continuation payoff of an infected individual is zero, because the loss from infection
has already been incorporated into the first period payoff.
Suppose cˇ < (1−aˇ2)r2`2, interpreted as a large risk and loss from catching the disease
at the height of the epidemic, high prevention effectiveness 1 − aˇ2, or a small cost of
preventive measures. Then pi∗2 = −aˇ2r2`2− cˇ. Otherwise, the individual optimally does
nothing and obtains pi∗2 = −r2`2.
In the first period, the individual compares doing nothing (payoff −r1`1+(1−r1)pi∗2),
reducing the risk (payoff −aˇ1r1`1− cˇ+ (1− aˇ1r1)pi∗2) and increasing the risk (−aˆ1r1`1−
cˆ + (1 − aˆ1r1)pi∗2). Raising one’s risk is optimal if (1 − aˆ1)r1`1 + (1 − aˆ1)r1pi∗2 > cˆ and
(aˇ1−aˆ1)r1`1+(aˇ1−aˆ1)r1pi∗2 > cˆ− cˇ. These are equivalent to −r1(`1+pi∗2) > cˆaˆ1−1 because
cˆ − cˇ < cˆ and aˆ1 − aˇ1 > aˆ1 − 1. Recall that pi∗2 < 0. If the cost of increasing one’s
risk is small, the risk is large and can be significantly increased and the second-period
losses from infection and mitigation |pi∗2| are large enough, then the individual prefers
to increase risk initially, because this reduces the risk later when it is more costly. The
logic is similar to vaccination with a live attenuated vaccine which causes disease with
a small positive probability (e.g., most poliomyelitis cases were caused by the vaccine
over several years until the vaccine was phased out and the wild-type disease made a
comeback (Macklin et al., 2020)).1 Vaccination is still optimal, because it reduces the
1 Another analogy is counter-firing against forest fires (https://www.nwcg.gov/term/glossary/
counter-fire) and controlled burns to prevent large fires.
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infection risk over several years, and this risk when unvaccinated is substantially larger
than the likelihood of catching the disease from the vaccine.
In terms of the primitive parameters, if the individual plans to reduce risk in period
2, then in period 1, increasing the risk is optimal if
r1(−`1 + aˇ2r2`2 + cˇ) > cˆ
aˆ1 − 1 . (2)
If the individual anticipates doing nothing in period 2, then increasing the risk in period
1 is optimal when
r1(−`1 + r2`2) > cˆ
aˆ1 − 1 . (3)
The optimality of increasing one’s risk depends on the parameter values. The next sub-
section uses empirical estimates of the epidemic characteristics of the novel coronavirus
to calibrate (2) and (3). For the median estimates, increasing one’s risk early in the
epidemic is individually rational. The utility and informational assumptions underly-
ing the individual choices are discussed after the calibration. Section 3.1 calibrates the
individual best response in a continuous time epidemiological model and shows that
infecting oneself early remains the optimal strategy.
1.1 Calibration of the individual decision
Interpret period 2 as the peak of the epidemic, with the least resources available per
patient. Period 1 may be any time before the peak when the healthcare system still
has spare capacity for the epidemic disease carriers.
The infection rate in the population at the peak of the epidemic is estimated to
be 40–70% (Shlain, 2020), similarly to the rate Meltzer et al. (2015) estimate for an
influenza pandemic. Assume no deaths among the 70% of cases who are non-severe
and non-critical. Assume 4.67% of cases are critical, as in the data of Livingston and
Bucher (2020). Among critical cases, 49% survived in the data of Wu and McGoogan
(2020), 38.5% in Yang et al. (2020) and 21% in Zhou et al. (2020). Assume all critical
cases die without a ventilator. This is a lower bound on the case-fatality rate when
the healthcare system is overwhelmed, because severe cases become critical under a
shortage of medical professionals and supplies. An upper bound on the case-fatality
rate is that all severe and critical cases die.
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An estimated 160 000 ventilators are available in the US as of 1 April 2020 (Johns
Hopkins University Center for Health Security, 2020), which would cover 2.45% of the
critical cases (who form 2% of the US population of 329 million2 if 5% of infected are
critical and 40% of the population is infected) at the peak of the epidemic. Getting
infected at the peak of the epidemic then results in an expected death probability
between 0.0467(1 − 0.0245 · 0.51) = 0.046 and 0.3(1 − 0.0245 · 0.21) = 0.298, which is
the product of the probability of needing a ventilator and the probability of either not
obtaining one or dying even with ventilation. The large upper bound 0.298 assumes
severe cases become critical without medical intervention that is unavailable during the
peak of the epidemic, and die after becoming critical. Catching the disease early when
medical capacity is unconstrained results in an expected death probability 0.0467(1 −
0.51) = 0.023 (Onder et al., 2020). If expected utility is linear in the death probability,
then the loss ratio `2/`1 between being infected at the peak of the epidemic and initially
is in the range [0.046
0.023
, 0.298
0.023
], i.e., from 2 to 13.
Trying to catch the disease deliberately likely has close to 100% success rate, so
in (3), aˆ1r1 ≈ 1. The fraction infected is close to zero early in an epidemic, which
makes (3) approximately −`1 + r2`2 > cˆ and (2) to −`1 + aˇ2r2`2 + cˇ > cˆ. Compared to
the loss of dying with probability over 1.38% (Verity et al., 2020), the cost of increasing
or decreasing one’s risk is likely small, in which case (3) is approximately r2`2 > `1
and (2) is aˇ2r2`2 > `1. Shlain (2020); Meltzer et al. (2015) predict a peak infection rate
of 40–70% even with control measures, so aˇ2r2 ≥ 0.4. Trying to catch the disease early
in an epidemic is individually rational if 0.4`2/`1 ≥ 1, i.e., `2 ≥ 2.5`1, which is at the
lower end of the range [2, 13] of loss ratios.
If expected utility decreases faster than linearly in the death probability, then `2/`1
increases and deliberate infection early becomes relatively more attractive. One cause of
the faster decrease in expected utility is risk aversion, because all death probabilities are
below 50%, so the larger probability is riskier (creates a Bernoulli random variable with
greater variance). Prospect theory predicts upward distortion of small probabilities, in
which case an increase in the likelihood of death translates into a slower than linear
reduction in the payoff. Then infecting oneself becomes relatively less attractive.
Information is imprecise early in an epidemic, so individuals have an option value
of waiting, which reduces their motive to increase their risk.
2https://www.census.gov/popclock/
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In a less severe epidemic where the peak infection rate in the US is below 1
13
of the
population (the China scenario), increasing one’s risk is not optimal. A lower fraction
of critical and severe cases has a similar effect as reducing the peak infection rate.
If the cost of infecting oneself is large, perhaps due to effective isolation of disease
carriers early in an epidemic, then the cost may outweigh the benefit of increasing one’s
risk. Conversely, if the cost of reducing one’s risk is large, then individuals optimally
do nothing in period 2, so their probability of catching the disease at the peak of the
epidemic is r2, higher than aˇ2r2 for any population infection rate. This increases the
motive to increase risk in period 1.
A necessary condition for increasing one’s risk to be optimal is that the loss increases
over time. Otherwise, a non-discounting agent is indifferent to the timing of risk and a
discounting agent strictly prefers to delay the infection. After the peak of the epidemic,
the risk and loss fall over time. For general decision problems with a decreasing hazard
rate, the results of Khan and Stinchcombe (2015) imply that it is always optimal to
reduce one’s risk and delay the disease.
If many people decide to get infected early when medical help is still available, then
of course the peak of infection arrives early. This gives individuals the incentive to delay
their disease past the peak, which in turn delays the peak. Conditional on catching
the illness, rational decision makers want it when others are healthy. The next section
discusses how arbitrage tends to equalize the net loss (the cost of changing the risk,
plus the product of the risk and the loss) across periods.
2 Infection arbitrage by interacting decision makers
To model the interaction of risk choices, let rt and lt in (2) and (3) increase in the
fraction σˆt of individuals choosing aˆt and decrease in the fraction σˇt taking aˇt. The
fall in period 2 risk and loss when more others choose to decrease risk, as (1) shows,
weakens the incentive for a given individual to reduce risk in period 2 and to increase
it in period 1. Similarly, the increase in period 1 risk and loss when others choose to
raise their risk decreases an individual’s incentive to increase risk in period 1 according
to (2) and (3).
The risk and loss in the second period may also decrease in the fraction infected
in period 1, but any effect across periods is assumed weaker than the corresponding
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effect within any period. Formally, the risk and loss are functions of the action history:
rt = rtf (σ
t) and `t = `tf (σ
t), where σt = (σˆτ , σˇτ )τ=1,...,t. Assume that for ft ∈ {rtf , `tf},
∂ft
∂σˆt
> ∂f2
∂σˆ1
≥ 0 ≥ ∂f2
∂σˇ1
> ∂ft
∂σˇt
. The assumption aˆt <
1
rt
is modified to aˆt <
1
max rtf (σt)
. The
interpretation is that infection confers (partial) immunity and a period is longer than
the course of illness. This further strengthens the anticoordination motive to catch the
disease when others are healthy.
Definition 1. A subgame perfect equilibrium consists of choices σ∗ = (σˆ∗t , σˇ
∗
t )t=1,2,
risks r∗ = (r∗t )t=1,2 and losses `
∗ = (`∗t )t=1,2 each period satisfying the following.
(a) σˆ∗2 = 0.
(b) If cˇ < (1− aˇ2)r∗2`∗2, then σˇ∗2 = 1, but if cˇ > (1− aˇ2)r∗2`∗2, then σˇ∗2 = 0.
(c) If r∗1(−`∗1 + aˇ2r∗2`∗2 + cˇ) > cˆaˆ1−1 and cˇ ≤ (1 − aˇ2)r∗2`∗2 or r∗1(−`∗1 + r∗2`∗2) > cˆaˆ1−1
and cˇ ≥ (1 − aˇ2)r∗2`∗2, then σˆ∗1 = 1. However, if r∗1(−`∗1 + aˇ2r∗2`∗2 + cˇ) < cˆaˆ1−1 and
cˇ ≤ (1− aˇ2)r∗2`∗2 or r∗1(−`∗1 + r∗2`∗2) < cˆaˆ1−1 and cˇ ≥ (1− aˇ2)r∗2`∗2, then σˆ∗1 = 0.
(d) If r∗1(`
∗
1 − aˇ2r∗2`∗2 − cˇ) > cˇ1−aˇ1 and cˇ ≤ (1 − aˇ2)r∗2`∗2 or r∗1(`∗1 − r∗2`∗2) > cˇ1−aˇ1 and
cˇ ≥ (1− aˇ2)r∗2`∗2, then σˇ∗1 = 1. If the strict inequalities reverse, then σˇ∗1 = 0.
(e) r∗t = rtf (σ
t∗) and `∗t = `tf (σ
t∗).
Subgame perfect equilibria are just called equilibria henceforth.
Assume for simplicity that the period 2 risk and loss cannot be reduced enough to
make doing nothing optimal even if all agents increase risk in period 1 and decrease it
in period 2. Formally, cˇ ≤ (1 − aˇ2) minσ{r2f (σ)`2f (σ)}, where arg minσ{r2f (σ)`2f (σ)}
is σˆ1 = 1, σˇ1 = 0, σˆ2 = 0, σˇ2 = 1. Then all equilibria feature σˇ
∗
2 = 1 and thus the
continuation payoff may be written as pi∗2(σ1) = −aˇ2r2f (σˆ1, σˇ1, 0, 1)`2f (σˆ1, σˇ1, 0, 1)− cˇ.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium set.
Proposition 1. 1. Doing nothing (a1 = 1) is an equilibrium if
− cˆ
aˆ1−1 ≤ r1f (0, 0)(`1f (0, 0) + pi∗2(0, 0)) ≤ cˇ1−aˇ1 .
2. Mixing between decreasing the risk and doing nothing is an equilibrium if
r1f (0, 1)(`1f (0, 1) + pi
∗
2(0, 1)) <
cˇ
1−aˇ1 < r1f (0, 0)(`1f (0, 0) + pi
∗
2(0, 0)).
3. Mixing between increasing the risk and doing nothing is an equilibrium if
−r1f (1, 0)(`1f (1, 0) + pi∗2(1, 0)) < cˆaˆ1−1 < −r1f (0, 0)(`1f (0, 0) + pi∗2(0, 0)).
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4. Decreasing the risk is an equilibrium if r1f (0, 1)(`1f (0, 1) + pi
∗
2(0, 1)) ≥ cˇ1−aˇ1 .
5. Increasing the risk is an equilibrium if −r1f (1, 0)(`1f (1, 0) + pi∗2(1, 0)) ≥ cˆaˆ1−1 .
Equilibrium is generically unique.
The proof is merely checking the conditions in Definition 1 and is thus omitted.
It is reasonable to assume that if everyone tries to get infected in the first period,
then the risk and loss are so large that individuals prefer not to increase their risk—
sufficient for this is `1f (1, 0) ≥ pi∗2(1, 0). Similarly, if all others choose to reduce risk,
then an individual prefers either doing nothing or increasing own risk, sufficient for
which is `1f (0, 1) ≤ pi∗2(0, 1). The reason is that imperfect protective measures by the
rest of society do not eliminate the disease, but reduce transmission enough that paying
the cost cˇ of risk reduction is individually suboptimal. Under these assumptions, the
candidate equilibria 4 and 5 in Proposition 1 are not equilibria. Then the conditions
guaranteeing mixed equilibria reduce to cˇ
1−aˇ1 < r1f (0, 0)(`1f (0, 0)+pi
∗
2(0, 0)) for decreas-
ing the risk (part 2) and cˆ
aˆ1−1 < −r1f (0, 0)(`1f (0, 0) + pi∗2(0, 0)) for increasing the risk
(3).
Focus on the parameter values at which the (negative) continuation payoff pi∗2(0, 0)
from doing nothing in period 1 is larger in absolute value than the loss `1f (0, 0) in
period 1. The interpretation is that the expected consequences of catching the disease
at the peak of the epidemic are worse than when catching it now with certainty. For
example, medical supplies run out, many healthcare professionals fall ill and the rest
are overloaded with patients, reducing the probability that a given person receives ade-
quate treatment. If treatment is effective enough and the probability that the epidemic
exhausts medical capabilities large enough, then getting infected early is optimal.
When `1f (0, 0) < |pi∗2(0, 0)|, no equilibrium involves decreasing the risk in the first
period. For a small enough cost cˆ, the unique equilibrium is that a fraction of the
population increases their risk and the rest do nothing. This is formalized in the
following corollary.
Corollary 2. If −r1f (1, 0)(`1f (1, 0)+pi∗2(1, 0)) < cˆaˆ1−1 < −r1f (0, 0)(`1f (0, 0)+pi∗2(0, 0)),
then in the unique equilibrium, σˇ1 = 0 and σˆ
∗
1 solves −r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)(`1f (σˆ∗1, 0)+pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)) =
cˆ
aˆ1−1 .
The arbitrage of infection timing decreases the difference between the losses in differ-
ent periods relative to doing nothing or reducing risk initially: |pi∗2(σˆ1, σˇ1)|−`1f (σˆ1, σˇ1) >
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|pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)| − `1f (σˆ∗1, 0) > 0 for any σˆ1 < σˆ∗1 and any σˇ1. Corollary 2 additionally implies
|pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)|−`1f (σˆ∗1, 0) = cˆr1f (σˆ∗1 ,0)aˆ1−r1f (σˆ∗1 ,0) , which goes to zero in cˆ, with the implication
that if the costs of arbitrage are small, then so is the difference between the initial loss
and the expected future loss. Arbitrage thus ‘flattens out’ the peak of the epidemic in
terms of both infection risk and the loss conditional on infection. For a single agent,
this improves payoff by revealed preference. However, strategic interaction may yield a
positive or negative welfare effect. The following proposition provides sufficient condi-
tions for increases and decreases in welfare from flattening the peak of the epidemic by
early infection, compared to doing nothing.
Proposition 3. There exists ∆r`2 > 0 s.t. if
r2f (0, 0, 0, 1)`2f (0, 0, 0, 1)− r2f (1, 0, 0, 1)`2f (1, 0, 0, 1) ≤ ∆r`2,
then welfare in the equilibrium in which individuals in period 1 mix to increase their
risk is less than when all individuals do nothing. There exists ∆r`1 > 0 s.t. if
r1f (1, 0)`1f (1, 0)− r1f (0, 0)`1f (0, 0) < ∆r`1 and pi2(1, 0) > pi2(0, 0),
then welfare in the equilibrium in which individuals in period 1 mix to increase their
risk is greater than when all individuals do nothing.
Proof. pi2(1, 0) = −aˇ2r2f (1, 0, 0, 1)`2f (1, 0, 0, 1) − cˇ, so if r2f (0, 0, 0, 1)`2f (0, 0, 0, 1) −
r2f (1, 0, 0, 1)`2f (1, 0, 0, 1) ≤ ∆r`2, then pi2(1, 0) − pi2(0, 0) ≤ aˇ2∆r`2. The indifference
condition
− aˆ1r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)`1f (σˆ∗1, 0)− cˆ+ (1− aˆ1r1f (σˆ∗1, 0))pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)
= −r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)`1f (σˆ∗1, 0) + (1− r1f (σˆ∗1, 0))pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)
of the mixed equilibrium implies that the average payoff in it is −r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)`1f (σˆ∗1, 0) +
(1 − r1f (σˆ∗1, 0))pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0). The average payoff if everyone does nothing in the first pe-
riod is −r1f (0, 0)`1f (0, 0) + (1 − r1f (0, 0))pi∗2(0, 0). The difference between the average
equilibrium payoff and the average payoff when everyone does nothing is
r1f (0, 0)`1f (0, 0)− r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)`1f (σˆ∗1, 0) + (1− r1f (σˆ∗1, 0))pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)− (1− r1f (0, 0))pi∗2(0, 0),
(4)
which is continuous.
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The risk and loss increase in period 1, so if |pi2(1, 0)−pi2(0, 0)| → 0 (the continuation
payoff becomes constant in σ1), then (4) converges to
r1f (0, 0)`1f (0, 0)− r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)`1f (σˆ∗1, 0) + [r1f (0, 0)− r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)]pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)
< [r1f (0, 0)− r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)][`1f (σˆ∗1, 0) + pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)] = [r1f (0, 0)− r1f (σˆ∗1, 0)]
cˆ
aˆ1 − 1 < 0,
where the equality comes from Corollary 2.
If |r1f (0, 0)`1f (0, 0)−r1f (1, 0)`1f (1, 0)| → 0, then by implication, |r1f (0, 0)`1f (0, 0)−
r1f (σˆ
∗
1, 0)`1f (σˆ
∗
1, 0)| → 0, so the payoff difference (4) converges to (1−r1f (0, 0))[pi∗2(σˆ∗1, 0)−
pi∗2(0, 0)] > 0.
Unsurprisingly, increasing the risk and loss initially without much compensating
decrease later worsens welfare. On the other hand, the equilibrium (increasing risk
initially) is better than doing nothing when the risk and loss do not rise much at
the start of the epidemic but fall during the peak. The welfare-maximizing strategy
depends on the generally nonlinear rtf and `tf . For any σ in which σˆtσˇt = 0 (risk is
not simultaneously increased and decreased), there may exist risk and loss functions
making this σ socially optimal. For generic risk and loss functions, no equilibrium is
efficient, i.e., the welfare-maximizing strategy is not an equilibrium. The reason is the
externalities of transmission and peak load imposed by individual decisions.
To derive clearer welfare comparisons and policy implications, more structure needs
to be imposed on the risk and loss functions. The next section derives the risk from
the standard SIR model. The loss is derived from dividing the medical capacity by the
number infected.
2.1 Welfare in the SIR model with early infection
The risk function is derived from the standard continuous time SIR compartmental
model of Kermack and McKendrick (1927), reformulated in terms of fractions of the
population instead of absolute numbers of people. Fraction St is susceptible, It infected
and Rt = 1 − St − It recovered, resistant or dead at time t. These fractions change
over time as dSt
dt
= −βStIt, dItdt = βStIt − γIt and dRtdt = γIt. Harko et al. (2014) solve
for the paths of change of the susceptible, infected and resistant fractions given initial
conditions (S0, I0, R0) > 0.
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For technical convenience, the SIR model assumes the recovery times of infected
people are exponentially distributed. This is unrealistic, because the duration of infec-
tion usually has an upper bound.3 If the recovery times are exponentially distributed,
then increasing risk is never optimal, because the peak of the epidemic from a higher
initial infected fraction is always higher and occurs earlier (Toda, 2020). However, with
bounded recovery times, infecting part of the population early reduces the height of the
peak of the epidemic when the initially infected recover significantly before the peak
(which now occurs earlier). There is no closed form solution to the SIR model with
bounded recovery times. Figure 1 shows a numerical example4 in which deliberate early
infection yields higher welfare. The parameters of the epidemic can be interpreted as
incorporating the effect of standard infection control measures, in which case the com-
parison is between deliberate infection initially, followed by the control policy that
would be optimal if early infection was not feasible, and this optimal control without
early infection.
For simplicity and easier visualization, the duration of infection is assumed exactly
10 days, so on day 11 all the initially infected people recover. A bounded distribution
of infection times would smooth out the downward jump in the fraction infected with-
out changing the qualitative insight. In Figure 1, with early deliberate infection the
epidemic peaks on days 10 and 14 on which 37% of the population is infected. Without
early infection, the single peak on day 50 has 40% of the population infected.
Of course, if the fraction infected early is large enough, then both peaks of the
epidemic are higher than without early infection. The optimal policy needs to be
precisely tailored to the parameters of the disease, which is difficult especially for newly
emerging infections about which information is limited.
The SIR model assumes random mixing, so the early infected infect others. If
they could be quarantined until they recover, then this increases the welfare gain from
deliberate early infection relative to standard policies. Because early infection is also
individually optimal, volunteers may be found who are sufficiently altruistic to agree
to quarantine in exchange for getting access to the disease agent early.
3Zhou et al. (2020) find the longest duration of viral shedding for Covid-19 is 37 days. This is for
a hospitalized case; the duration with mild symptoms is likely shorter.
4 Mathematica code for the example is available on the author’s website https://sanderheinsalu.
com/
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Figure 1: Susceptible (blue curve), infected (orange) and recovered (green) fractions of
the population without deliberate infection (dashed curves) and with initially infecting
5% (solid curves). Parameters: β = 0.4, γ = 0.1, average duration of disease 10 days.
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If welfare (the negative of the aggregate loss) only depended on the height of the
peak, then the policy comparison in Figure 1 would be clear. However, the loss also
depends on how long the infected fraction stays above the capacity of the healthcare
system, and how high above. To account for these effects, the loss function is next
defined explicitly. Welfare is the negative of the integral of the loss function over the
horizon of the epidemic.
The per-person loss function is assumed constant (normalized to 1) if the infected
fraction I of the population is less than the capacity K of the medical system. If I > K,
then the loss is 1 + λ(1− K
I
), with λ > 0 the increase in per-person loss if the capacity
were zero. The interpretation is that λ is the extra loss from not getting treatment
conditional on infection and 1 − K
I
is the probability of not getting treatment due to
rationing of the capacity.
Welfare is − ∫ tmax
0
It[1+1 {It > K}λ(1−KIt )]dt over the horizon tmax of the epidemic.
As long as tmax is substantially later than the peak of the epidemic, its value (here taken
to be 90 days) does not materially influence the results, because after the peak, the
fraction infected declines at an exponential rate.
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Table 1: Aggregate loss
∫ tmax
0
It[1 + 1 {It > K}λ(1 − KIt )]dt with and without early
infection. Parameters β = 0.4, γ = 0.1, average duration of disease 10 days.
K λ Early infection No early infection
0.0097 1 17.83 18.59
0.0016 1 18.38 19.09
0.0097 12 112.1 117.5
0.0016 12 118.7 123.5
As in Section 1.1, assume for the US 160 000 ventilators, population 329 million,
ventilation needed by between 5% and 30% of the infected (the latter when serious cases
become critical due to lack of care). In this case, K is between 160 000
0.05·329 000 000 = 0.0097
and 160 000
0.3·329 000 000 = 0.0016. The death probability without treatment is between 0.0467
and 0.3, but with treatment is 0.023. The ratio of the death probabilities is assumed
to be the loss ratio `2/`1 ∈ [2, 13], which defines λ = `2−`1`1 ∈ [1, 12].
Table 1 shows the aggregate losses in the cases in which the fraction needing venti-
lation is 5% or 30% and the ratio of expected individual loss between early and peak
infection is 1 or 12. The loss is less (welfare is greater) with early infection in all cases.
Under other parameter values, the standard policy may yield greater welfare despite
the higher peak of infection. The intuition is that flattening the peak with early infection
also spreads it wider, so the infection rate may be above the capacity of the healthcare
system for a longer time, depending on the capacity. If the capacity is low and the loss
rises slowly enough in the amount by which the infected exceed the capacity, then the
wider and flatter peak with early infection may be worse.
A similar welfare-improving early risk increase is possible in a discrete-time SEIR
model where people go through an exposed state before transitioning to the infected
state. Exposed means non-infectious but carrying the disease, as during an incubation
period. Let Et denote the fraction of the population in the exposed state in period t.
The duration of the exposed period is dE and the duration of infection dI . The SEIR
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model is
St = St−1 − βSt−1It−1, Et = Et−1 + βSt−1It−1 − βSt−1−dEIt−1−dE ,
It = It−1 + βSt−1−dEIt−1−dE − βSt−1−dE−dIIt−1−dE−dI ,
Rt = Rt−1 + βSt−1−dE−dIIt−1−dE−dI .
For a numerical example of early exposure reducing peak infection, take β = 1.8, dE = 3
and dI = 6. If S0 = 1− 10−5, E0 = 10−5, I0 = R0 = 0, then the peak fraction infected
is Imax = 0.7055, but if S0 = 0.95, E0 = 0.05, I0 = R0 = 0, then Imax = 0.7292.
3 Dynamic risk choices
Time is continuous, indexed by t, and the horizon infinite. The discount rate is ρ ≥ 0.
An individual faces a time-varying risk (a Poisson rate) rt and suffers a loss of size
`t ∈ R+ if the risk realizes. The risk may be derived from an SIR model but does not
have to be. The loss may be derived from the probability of dying, which depends on
the available medical capacity at that time during the epidemic.
Action at changes the risk to atrt. The actions are: do nothing (at = 1), increase
risk (at = aˆt > 1) or decrease it (at = aˇ ∈ (0, 1)), with respective costs c(1) = 0,
c(aˆt) = cˆ and c(aˇ) = cˇ. Assume aˆt is continuous in t.
The individual’s value at time t under an optimal strategy is denoted Vt. The value
is bounded above by 0 because the cost and the loss both cause negative payoffs. The
value is bounded below by −maxτ≥t `t > −∞, because doing nothing forever is feasible.
The individual’s dynamic programming problem is
ρVt = max
at
{
−c(at) + dVt
dt
+ atrt(−`t − Vt)
}
. (5)
The optimal action is
at =

aˆt if (aˆt − 1)rt(|Vt| − `t) > cˆ,
aˇ if (1− aˇ)rt(`t + Vt) > cˇ,
1 if (aˆt − 1)rt(|Vt| − `t) ≤ cˆ and (1− aˇ)rt(`t + Vt) ≤ cˇ.
(6)
For increasing one’s risk to be optimal, a necessary condition is |Vt| > `t, thus `t <
maxτ≥t `τ . The interpretation is that the peak of the epidemic has not been reached
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yet. The value is
Vt = −
∫ ∞
t
exp
(
−
∫ x
t
(ρ+ ayry)dy
)
[c(ax) + axrx`x]dx (7)
> V t := −
∫ ∞
t
exp
(
−
∫ x
t
(ρ+ aˆyry)dy
)
(aˇrx`x)dx. (8)
The value is continuous for any bounded (ax, rx, `x)
∞
x=t.
Assume rt, `t are continuous in t, single-peaked (as is typical for an epidemic) with a
peak at tmax > 0. Assume limt→∞ rt`t = 0 (eventually improved vaccines and treatments
make the risk and loss arbitrarily small). The following proposition characterises the
individually optimal action paths.
Proposition 4. There exists t1 ≥ 0 s.t. at = 1 ∀t ≥ t1. If −V t > cˆ(aˆt−1)rt + `t, then
there exist t0 < t↓ < tmax < t1 s.t. the optimal strategy is at = aˆt for t ∈ [t, t0), at = 1
for t ∈ [t0, t↓], at = aˇ for t ∈ (t↓, t1) and at = 1 for t ≥ t1. There exists k depending on
ρ and cˆ
(aˆt−1)rt + `t s.t. if maxx≥t aˇrx`x ≥ k, then −V t > cˆ(aˆt−1)rt + `t.
Proof. The bound |Vt| ≤ maxτ≥t `t implies limt→∞ |Vt| = 0. Therefore there exists t1
s.t. for any t ≥ t1, (aˆt − 1)rt(|Vt| − `t) ≤ cˆ and (1 − aˇ)rt(`t + Vt) ≤ cˇ. So the optimal
action is at = 1.
Continuity of aˆt, rt, `t, Vt in t implies that the set of times at which a given action
is optimal is an interval and the intervals for aˆt and aˇ are not adjacent.
Denote by t1 ≥ 0 the earliest time after which doing nothing forever is optimal. The
value at t1 is
Vt1 = −
∫ ∞
t1
exp
(
−
∫ t
t1
(ρ+ ry)dy
)
rt`tdt. (9)
If t1 > 0, then t1 solves (1− aˇ)rt1(Vt1 + `t1) = cˇ.
If t1 > 0, then there exists t↓0 < tmax, t1 after which increasing one’s risk is never
optimal, because |Vt| < maxτ≥t `τ and `t < `tmax ∀t 6= tmax, so (aˆt− 1)rt(|Vt|− `t) < 0 <
cˆ ∀t ≥ tmax. If t↓0 > 0, then t↓ = inf t↓0 solves (1− aˇ)rt↓(`t↓ + Vt↓) = cˇ, which is
− (1− aˇ)rt↓
∫ t1
t↓
exp
(
−
∫ x
t↓
(ρ+ aˇry)dy
)
[cˇ+ aˇrx`x]dx
+ (1− aˇ)rt↓ exp
(
−
∫ t1
t↓
(ρ+ aˇry)dy
)
Vt1 + (1− aˇ)rt↓`t↓ = cˇ,
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because t↓ is the earliest time after which the individual first reduces risk and then
switches to doing nothing. The minimality of t↓ and the continuity of rt, `t, Vt imply
there exists  > 0 s.t. (1−aˇ)rt(Vt+`t) ≤ cˇ and (aˆt−1)rt(|Vt|−`t) ≤ cˆ for all t ∈ (t↓−, t↓).
Denote the minimal such t↓− by t0. If positive, then it solves (aˆt0−1)rt0(|Vt0|−`t0) = cˆ,
equivalently∫ t↓
t0
exp
(
−
∫ x
t0
(ρ+ ry)dy
)
rx`xdx− exp
(
−
∫ t↓
t0
(ρ+ ry)dy
)
Vt↓ =
cˆ
(aˆt0 − 1)rt0
+ `t0 .
If t0 > 0, then by the continuity of rt, `t, Vt, there exists η > 0 s.t. (aˆt−1)rt(|Vt|−`t) > cˆ
for all t ∈ (t0 − η, t0). Based on (8), Vt > V t. If −V t > cˆ(aˆt−1)rt + `t, then at = aˆt is
optimal. Sufficient is that maxx≥t aˇrx`x is above a cutoff which increases in ρ and
cˆ
(aˆt−1)rt + `t.
Intuitively, if the risk and loss eventually vanish, then doing nothing becomes opti-
mal from some time onward. If the peak of the epidemic is severe enough, then reducing
risk is optimal in a time interval around the peak and increasing one’s risk is optimal
early on when the risk and loss are low compared to the peak. Between any intervals
of raising and reducing risk, there is an interval of doing nothing because the incentives
are continuous in time.
Next, the continuous time individual optimization problem is calibrated to the epi-
demiologic parameters of the 2019 coronavirus. Increasing one’s risk early on in the
epidemic turns out to be optimal, both when other individuals do nothing and when
all individuals respond optimally (so the risk and loss are derived from the decisions in
equilibrium).
3.1 Calibration of the dynamic individual decision
The Mathematica code for the simulations in this section is available on the author’s
website https://sanderheinsalu.com/. First, an individual decision is calibrated
assuming that the rest of society does not respond to the incentives to raise or reduce
risk. After that, the background risk is derived in equilibrium from individual choices.
The unit of time is one day. The discount factor is assumed zero because the time
horizon of the pandemic is less than one year. The risk function rt for t ≤ 104 is the
rate βIt at which susceptible people get infected in the SIR model of Kermack and
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McKendrick (1927).5 The parameters are I0 = 10
−6, β = 0.4 and γ = 0.1 (initially, one
in a million people is infected and the average duration of the illness is 10 days). At the
peak, 40% of the population is infected. After t = 104, the risk and loss are assumed
zero. The interpretation is vaccine and treatment development over the 104 days (27
years).
The per-person loss function `t for t ≤ 104 is 1 + 1 {I > K}λ(1 − KI ), so the loss
rises if the infected fraction I of the population exceeds the capacity K of the medical
system. As in Section 1.1, assume for the US 160 000 ventilators, population 329 million,
ventilation needed by between 5% and 30% of the infected (the latter when serious cases
become critical due to lack of care). In this case, K is between 160 000
0.05·329 000 000 = 0.0097
and 160 000
0.3·329 000 000 = 0.0016. The death probability without treatment is between 0.0467
and 0.3, but with treatment is 0.023. The ratio of the death probabilities is assumed
to be the loss ratio `2/`1 ∈ [2, 13], which defines λ = `2−`1`1 ∈ [1, 12].
The cost of reducing or increasing risk is assumed cˇ = cˆ = 0.01. The unit in which
costs and losses are measured is the death probability conditional on infection when
the medical system functions normally. The factor by which risk can be decreased or
increased is assumed to be 2, so that aˇ = 0.5 and aˆ = 2.
At λ = 1 and K = 0.0097, an individual optimally does nothing after t1 = 84,
reduces risk between t↓ = 44 and t1, does nothing between t0 = 31 and t↓ and increases
risk when t ∈ [0, t0). If λ = 12 and K = 0.0097, then t1 = 94, t↓ = 38 and t0 = 26. If
λ = 1 and K = 0.0016, then t1 = 85, t↓ = 44 and t0 = 25. If λ = 12 and K = 0.0016,
then t1 = 103, t↓ = 36 and t0 = 25. In all cases, increasing one’s risk initially is
optimal. Reducing the cost cˆ or increasing the effectiveness aˆt of raising the risk widens
the time interval during which raising one’s risk is the best response. On the other
hand, reducing cˇ or aˇ shortens this interval.
An equilibrium of the dynamic model consists of St, It, Rt, rt, Vt and a
∗
t such that
given a∗t , the aggregate variables evolve according to
dSt
dt
= −a∗tβStIt, dItdt = a∗tβStIt−γIt,
dRt
dt
= γIt, the risk is rt = a
∗
tβIt and the value function is (7), and given rt, Vt, the
individual’s optimal policy is (6).
Equilibrium can be found numerically. In it, the individual’s optimal policy remains
5Fraction St is susceptible, It infected and Rt = 1 − St − It recovered, resistant or dead at time
t. The fractions evolve as dStdt = −βStIt, dItdt = βStIt − γIt and dRtdt = γIt. Thus a susceptible gets
infected at rate − dStStdt =
βStIt
St
.
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qualitatively similar to the one calibrated above. For example, if λ = 1 and K = 0.0097,
then each individual optimally does nothing after t1 = 64, reduces risk between t↓ = 20
and t1, does nothing between t0 = 18 and t↓ and increases risk when t ∈ [0, t0). The
increased risk taken by all individuals early in the epidemic compresses the epidemic
in time. The cutoff times t0, t↓, t1 and the peak time tmax occur earlier tan when all
individuals do nothing. The ex ante value if everyone does nothing is −1.882, but the
equilibrium value −1.98. Welfare is lower in equilibrium than under doing nothing
because the transmission externality outweighs the peak load externality.
4 Conclusion
Imperfect measures to reduce infection, even if costless, may be suboptimal. By con-
trast, deliberately infecting a fraction of the population early, even at extra cost, in-
creases welfare under some parameter values that match the Covid-19 data.
The policy of infecting part of the population early is difficult to implement. Even
relatively safe vaccines are refused. A live unattenuated vaccine (the wild-type disease
agent) likely generates even more opposition, although it is probably more immunogenic
than safer vaccines.
Another practical problem is evaluating the optimality of any infection control pol-
icy, including early infection, at the start of an epidemic. Information is limited, so the
parameters of the disease that determine the optimal control method are imprecisely
estimated. Given the risk of worsening the epidemic by infecting too large a fraction
of the population early, the principle of ‘first, do no harm’ argues against the early
infection strategy.
An argument against the early infection policy is that the epidemic may not be
severe. If its peak still leaves spare capacity in the healthcare system, then there is no
benefit to flattening and spreading the peak. The benefit relies on (at least partial)
immunity generated by early infection, so is negative for diseases that lie dormant in
the organism (herpes, HIV, tuberculosis, cancer) and flare up later. For diseases with a
long duration (HIV), discounting over the course of the epidemic is a significant factor
in preferences and welfare. Discounting reduces the benefit of early infection, which
moves the peak of the epidemic earlier.
Risk aversion increases the benefit of the early infection policy for at least two
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reasons. A certain early infection with the same expected loss is preferable to an
uncertain later one. The probability of death is closer to 1
2
at the peak of the epidemic
than early on, thus generates a lottery with higher variance, which a risk averse decision
maker dislikes. Prospect theory preferences, on the other hand, are risk loving for
lotteries with negative outcomes, thus reduce the benefit of early infection.
The benefit calculation for the SIR model in this paper assumes random mixing. If
instead the initially deliberately infected volunteers are quarantined until they recover,
then the welfare gain relative to standard policies is greater.
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